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Statutes of Limitations. McBurney v. Roszkowski, 687 A.2d 447
(R.I. 1997). Tort of intentional interference with a contract is not
an "injury to a person" as outlined in section 9-1-14(b) of the Rhode
Island General Laws,' but is considered contractual in nature and
therefore subject to a ten-year statute of limitations.2
If the underlying cause of action, although tortious, stems
from a contractual relationship, then the petitioner maintains a
right to sue in contract under section 9-1-13(a) of the Rhode Island
General Laws which imposes a ten-year statute of limitations. In
McBurney v. Roszkowski, 3 the Rhode Island Supreme Court up-
held Pickering v. American Employers Insurance Co.,4 which dis-
tinguished the difference between a cause of action entirely within
the realm of "injury to a person," and a claim which has those ele-
ments, but is inherently a derivative of contract.5
FACTS AND TRAVEL
John McBurney (McBurney), a practicing attorney in Rhode
Island, filed suit in June of 1994 claiming that in June of 1989,
Joseph Roszkowski (Roszkowski), also a practicing attorney, inter-
fered with a contractual relationship between McBurney and a cli-
ent.6 McBurney claimed that he conveyed a settlement offer to his
client, Shirley Salerno (Salerno), in the amount of $60,000.7 Mc-
Burney had created an attorney-client contract with Salerno where
he agreed to represent her in an automobile accident." McBurney
claimed that on the defendant's advice, Salerno rejected the settle-
ment offer, fired McBurney and retained defendant Roszkowski as
her attorney. The defendant claimed that the statute of limita-
tions had expired because the claim related to an "injury to the
person." As a result, the defendant asserted that the claim fell
under section 9-1-14(b) of the Rhode Island General Laws, which
required filing within three years of the tortious event.9 The
1. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14(b) (1956) (1997 Reenactment).
2. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-13(a) (1956).
3. 687 A.2d 447 (R.I. 1997).
4. 282 A.2d 584 (R.I. 1971).
5. See id. at 588.
6. See McBurney, 687 A.2d at 448.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14(b).
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supreme court disagreed and held that because the relationship
was conceived in contract, section 9-1-13(a) controls, and a ten-
year statute of limitations is appropriate.10
BACKGROUND
When the Rhode Island General Laws were enacted in 1896,
the General Assembly based the period of limitation on the form of
the action brought, not on the nature of the injury that resulted
from the tortious conduct." In 1902, the legislature attempted to
limit the commencement of actions on the basis of the character of
injury that resulted, rather than on the form of the action
brought.' 2 Following this repositioning of law, the general laws
provided that actions for injuries to the person were barred unless
brought within two years13 from the time of accrual whether the
injury stemmed from direct, intentional tortious conduct or indi-
rect, unintentional conduct. 14 The Rhode Island General Laws
codified the period of limitation on injuries to the person at three
years, 15 while all other civil actions shall be commenced within ten
years. 16 In McBurney v. Roszkowski, the court again clarified any
ambiguity between the two limitation periods. 17
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The cornerstone of the court's analysis is based on two Rhode
Island Supreme Court cases, Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v.
Miner'8 and Pickering v. American Employers Insurance Co. 19 The
10. See id.
11. R.I. Gen. Laws ch. 234, § 2-3 (1896). Actions of trespass for injury result-
ing from direct or intentional tortious acts were barred if not commenced within
four years. On the other hand, actions for indirect or unintentional injury were
barred if not commenced within six years.
12. See 1902 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 976, § 1-2. Actions for injuries to the person
were barred unless brought within two years from the time of the accrual.
13. This has now been expanded to three years. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14(b).
14. See Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner, 199 A.2d 606, 608 (R.I. 1964).
15. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14(b) (stating that "actions for injuries to the per-
son shall be commenced and sued within three (3) years next after the cause of
action shall accrue, and not after").
16. See R.I. Gen Laws § 9-1-13(a) (stating that, "except as otherwise specifi-
cally provided, all civil actions shall be commenced within ten (10) years next after
the cause of action shall accrue, and not after").
17. McBurney, 687 A.2d at 448.
18. 199 A-2d 606 (R.I. 1964).
19. 282 A.2d 584 (R.I. 1971).
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court first visited the issue of whether injuries to the person meant
merely physical injuries in Commerce Oil.2° In Commerce Oil, the
developer of an oil refinery brought suit against a group of resi-
dents in the town of Jamestown, Rhode Island.21 The plaintiff
sought damages for an alleged conspiracy to obstruct the erection
of an oil refinery pursuant to town licensing of the refinery. 22 The
defendants eventually counterclaimed on the grounds of malicious
use of process. On appeal, the plaintiff urged that malicious use of
process is an injury to the person as defined in section 9-1-14(b). 23
Therefore, the refining company argued that the action should be
barred by the statute of limitations. 24 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court agreed and stated that a literal reading of injury to the per-
son would assume an interpretation that was too restrictive.25 The
Commerce Oil court did not embrace a specific rationale, but noted
that it was significant that the legislature eliminated the distinc-
tion between intentional and unintentional tortious injury.26 The
elimination of this distinction, the court reasoned, gave the court
authority to interpret injury to the person broadly.27 The court
held that Commerce Oil effectively expanded the scope of the stat-
ute beyond mere physical injury by disallowing the defendant's
counterclaim of malicious use of process and subjecting it to a two
year limitation under section 9-1-14(b) of the Rhode Island General
Laws. 28
Commerce Oil, however, did not survive as the sole authority
for long. In Pickering v. American Employers Insurance Co.,29 the
court for the first time faced a quagmire involving both contract
20. 199 A.2d 606.




25. See McBurney, 687 A.2d at 609. ("It would, under these circumstances, be
an oversimplified solution of the problem if statutory interpretation were to be sub-
jected to the test of the ordinary and natural meaning of language as understood
by the man of average intelligence.").
26. Commerce Oil, 199 A.2d at 607.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 610 ("It is then our conclusion that the phrase 'injuries to the
person' as used in the instant statute is to be construed comprehensively and as
contemplating its application to actions involving injuries that are other than
physical.").
29. 282 A.2d 584 (R.I. 1971).
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and tort law.30 Pickering involved an insured motorist who at-
tempted to sue her insurance company for the difference between
what she collected from the defendant's insurance company and
the minimum personal-injury coverage required by Rhode Island
law.3 ' As the plaintiffs policy had a provision for coverage in the
event of liability on behalf of an uninsured motorist, Pickering
sought to collect the full amount for her injuries.3 2 Pickering's in-
surance company attempted to deny coverage on the basis that the
statute of limitations had run its course because the claim involved
an injury to the person.3 3 The Pickering court chose to augment
the interpretation of section 9-1-14(b) in light of the expanded defi-
nition established in Commerce Oil. Although Pickering involves
tortious injury, the court found the action was fundamentally one
in contract.
In carving out this interpretation, the McBurney court em-
braced the pre-1902 action principle3 4 and endorsed the Commerce
Oil rationale.3 5 The court revisited the action principle in McBur-
ney when it determined that the principle action is the basis for
determining whether a claim falls inside section 9-1-14(b) or in the
alternative into section 9-1-13(a). In applying the Commerce Oil
rationale, the court reasoned that because the "action" was one
that was fundamentally in contract, the ten-year statute of limita-
tions was appropriate.
30. Pickering was actually the second time the supreme court faced a question
of limitation involving both tort and contract. The court declined to address the
matter in Lessard v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., 258 A.2d 793 (R.I. 1960). See
Pickering, 282 A.2d at 588.
31. Pickering, 282 A.2d at 588. In 1971, Rhode Island law required $10,000 in
personal injury coverage on automotive insurance. See id. at 589; see also R.I. Gen.
Laws §§ 27-7-2.1, 31-31-7 (1956) (1994 Reenactment) (governing the minimum
threshold on personal-injury coverage).
32. See Pickering, 282 A.2d at 586 (determining that the plaintiff had incurred
$25,000 in damages). The defendant's policy paid out $5000. The plaintiff sought
to recover the difference of $20,000 from her policy. See id.
33. See id.
34. See supra notes 12, 13.
35. "It can be seen that in Commerce Oil Refining Corp., . . . expanding the
definition of 'injuries to the person' within the framework of tortious conduct and
claims recognized the difference between a tort action based on 'injuries to the
person' and action brought because of a right created by contract." Pickering, 282
A.2d at 588.
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CONCLUSION
The McBurney court determined that a tortious injury based
in contract falls under section 9-1-13(b) of the Rhode Island Gen-
eral Laws. The court noted that any rights that accrued to the
plaintiff did so by reason of McBurney's contractual relationship
with his client, Salerno.36 But for this contractual relationship,
there would be no claim for tortious interference.37 In embracing
this rationale, the court squarely aligned itself behind Pickering.
The court stated that such rights associated with man as a rational
being are wholly and distinctly separate from those rights "which
accrue to an individual by reason of some peculiar status or by vir-
tue of an interest created by contract or property."38 In allowing
claims "based in contract" longer limitation periods, 39 McBurney
reestablishes an old rationale whereby it creates a workable stan-
dard to determine proper limitation periods. 40
William J. Powers, TV
36. McBurney, 687 A.2d at 449.
37. See id.
38. Id. at 448 (citing Commerce Oil Refining v. Miner, 199 A.2d 606 (R.I.
1964)).
39. As outlined in section 9-1-13(a) of the Rhode Island General Laws, claims
"based in contract" have a ten-year-limitation period. Cf. § 9-1-14(b) (allowing a
three-year-limitation period for claims not "based in contract").
40. See Pickering, 282 A.2d 584 (holding that a claim involving tortious con-
duct stems from a claim in contract and therefore falls under section 9-1-13(a) of
the Rhode Island General Laws).
